

## The Views of Byzantine Thinker Theodoros Metochites about the Sorrow, and the Instability of Human Life

**Sotiria, A. Triantari**

Associate Professor in Philosophy  
School of Education  
University of Western of Macedonia

**Foteini, P. Sarimichailidou**

PhD candidate in Philosophy  
School of Philosophy and Education  
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

### Abstract

*The purpose of this study is to show, first, that Theodoros Metochites recognized the human weakness to lead a life without sorrow “*ἄλγος βίος*” and proceeded to the distinction of sorrow that is not up to us caused by external reasons and the sorrow that is up to us due to the human will. The sorrow that is up to us is related to learning and constitutes treatment for the estrangement of a human being from the sorrow that is not up to us and the turn to himself. Second, aim is to show that Metochites’ perception about a life without sorrow “*ἄλγος βίος*” was influenced by Stoic Epictetus’ views, which respect to the proairesis, and particularly what it’s up to us.*

**Keywords:** Sorrow, human will, education

### ***Introduction: The Intellectual Context of Metochites Time***

Theodoros Metochites (1260-1332) was an authentic Humanist, who lived in the Palaiologan period. He was the son of the pro-unionist George Metochites. His parents supervised his early education and Theodoros himself showed a great zeal for learning. At the age of thirteen he had a complete *Enkyklios paideia*. After he had completed the study of grammar and poetry, he started a course in rhetoric. When his parents were exiled in Asia Minor, he continued his education there. The next step in his education in Asia Minor was the study of Aristotle’s logic and syllogistic (Treu, 1985:344-353; Ševčenko, 1975, 19-55; Loenertz, 1953:184-194; Constantinides, 1982:90). He studied astronomy under the private tuition of Manuel Bryennios (Pingree, 1964:137; Constantinides, 1982:95; Haramoundanis, 2007:776). Furthermore, he seems to have studied theology, and he continued his studies in Aristotle’s logic, physics and ethics. He trained himself in the art of rhetoric (Treu, 1895:403-420; Constantinides, 1982:91).

Metochites expressed his views on Philo, Synesio and Skeptics. Despite the fact that he followed the line of Aristotle’s commentaries, he criticized the Aristotelian views and influenced his pupil Nikephoros Gregoras (1295-1361) (Tatakis, 1977:232; Triantari-Mara, 2002:11-13). Metochites showed a great respect to the tradition of Later Antiquity. The curriculum, which he followed, and his attitude towards Plato and Aristotle, showed that he was influenced significantly by the tradition of Michael Psellos. Specifically, he interpreted Aristotle’s works with the help of Neoplatonic commentators, according to the example of Psellos (Tatakis, 1977:232). Obviously, Metochites was capable of knowing works of other philosophers through the Neoplatonic commentators.

We would assume that Metochites read the *Handbook* (Epictetus, 2004; 1983) not only from the stoic Epictetus himself but also from the commentaries of Neoplatonist Simplicius in it (Simplicius, 1800). Our assumption can be justified by the fact that, first, he respected the tradition of the Later Antiquity. Second, he had studied Neoplatonic commentators, and therefore he might have studied Simplicius as well, who was a great Neoplatonist Philosopher of the 6<sup>th</sup> century and a member of the Platonic Academy and most importantly he was a considerate commentator of Aristotle’s works.

Third, the above aspect strengthens the fact that Metochites lived at a period, in which the commentaries were not strictly limited to Aristotle but also contained material from other ancient Greek philosophers including Plato and the Neoplatonist (Constantinides, 1982:126). Fourth, The *Handbook* of Epictetus was known in Palaiologan Period. According to G. Boter the oldest authentic text of the *Handbook* dates back to the fourteenth century (Boter, 1999:149; Triantari, 2014:86). Moreover, there are references to specific passages of the *Handbook* in the works of the later Byzantine thinkers such as Antonius the Great and John Eugenicus. In addition, the commentaries of Dion Crysostom and Lucianos, Kecaumenos' *Strategicon* as well as Plethon's *De Virtutibus* (Boter, 1999:117;) are occasionally reminiscent of the *Handbook* (Boter, 1999:14-15).

The later Byzantine thinkers of 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century knew the *Handbook* of Epictetus through the commentaries of Neoplatonist Simplicius. Specifically, Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197–1272 AD), who was the predecessor of Metochites, mediated these commentaries, and in his short treatise *De virtute et ascesi* (Blemmydes, 1784:139, 10-13; 2013) approached Epictetus' views with regard to the human *proairesis* and in the context of practicing virtues in everyday life (Triantari, 2014: 86, 90-93).

Possibly, Blemmydes influenced later thinkers, who found available the Neoplatonic and Christian perceptions in the commentaries of Neoplatonist Simplicius. Also, we must consider that Blemmydes, who commented on Aristotle's works, ran his own school, and enrolled Pachymeres and Sophonias. The line of commentaries on Aristotle continued through the scholars of the Palaiologan period, such as Joseph the Philosopher, Theodoros Metochites, Isaac Argyros, John Chortasmenos and George Scholarios. All these scholars prepared their own works on Aristotle (Constantinides, 1982:126-127). The common interest about the commentaries of Aristotelian works could be a basic reason, so that thinkers of the Palaiologan period had studied the commentaries of Simplicius, who was par excellence a Neoplatonist commentator of Aristotle.

Fifth, Metochites lived in an epoch-making changes, grew up in banishment with his father and he assumed high offices by the Emperor Andronikos II Palaeologos. When Andronikos fell off the throne he drew Metochites with him, who was exiled in Didimotihio. The historical changes of his time in connection with his personal experiences caused Metochites to have a pessimistic attitude towards life. Obviously, Metochites, as his predecessor stoic Epictetus, encountered adventures and difficulties in life, which determined his attitude towards philosophy. From this position Metochites praised the importance and priority of practical life against the theoretical part and he emphasized the moral philosophy (Metochites, 1995:46). However, Metochites was not capable of capsizing the Byzantine theoretical and the Theology structure. This fact leads us to assume that Metochites used the *Handbook* of Epictetus in combination with the commentaries of Neoplatonist Simplicius, in order on the one hand, to show his preference to the Ancient Greek tradition on the other hand to approach and strengthen through this the Christian ethic theory.

These mentioned reasons could lead to the conclusion that the Byzantine eclecticism received its beliefs from earlier philosophical schools to which among others Stoicism belonged, and particularly the Stoicism of Epictetus. Taking Stoicism as a starting point, Epictetus (50–138 AD) came closer to Christianity, which allowed him to influence Pagans, namely the Neoplatonic philosophers as well as Christian philosophers like Ambrose (4th century AD), Great Basilus (330–379 AD), John Chrysostom (4th century AD), Clement of Alexandria (2nd century AD), Synesius (370–412 AD) and others (Stob, 1934/1935:217–224; Hatch, 1957; Colish, 1985; Triantari, 2014:85.) with his treatise *Handbook* (or *Encheiridion*). The views of H. Hunger and I. Polemis (Metochites, 1995: 24; Hüngrer, 1961:153) that Metochites knew the *Handbook* directly from Epictetus does not exclude the assumption that he had studied the *Handbook* of Epictetus through Neoplatonist Simplicius.

The *Handbook* of Epictetus strengthens the dynamic predisposition of the Stoics concerning human autonomy and self-control, which determine the quality of one's actions and release one from his passions. This predisposition was transmitted to Byzantine thinkers such as Theodoros Metochites, who opposed to the instability of life the human *proairesis*. Theodoros Metochites in his massive work *Hypomnematismi and Seimeiosis gnomikai* (Metochites 1966) expressed his views relating to sorrow and pains that a human being feels when he faces hard situations, either deriving from outer reasons or caused by his own will.

***The Sorrow that is not up to us***

Theodoros Metochites in chapter 28 (Metochites, 1966)<sup>1</sup> of *Hypomnismata* referred to passion (πάθος) coming from sorrow, stressing that there is no life without sorrow and pain. He argued that many changes happen in human life which are due to fortune (Beck, 2000:370) and external causes. Man often falls into misfortunate situations, having as a result that he behaves immaturely with his actions:

“οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν βίον ἄλυπον ἐν οὐδενί πάντοθεν ἐφορωμένῳ παναληθῆς τῷ τοῦ σώματος εὐολίσθῳ τὲ καὶ σφόδρ’ εὐτρόπῳ πρὸς πᾶν ἀργαλέον ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ ξυμπιπτοντος, ἢ ταῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἐπιβουλαῖς, καὶ τῷ ῥάστῳ πρὸς μεταβολὰς ἐκ βελτιόνων εἰς χείρονα, ᾧ διαπαντὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω στεφόμεθα, καὶ ἀνιαρῶς ὡς μάλιστα συμπερόμεθα” (Metochites, 1966: ch. 28,184; Metochites, 1995:231; Simplicius, 1800:217-218)<sup>2</sup>.

“There is no life without sorrow and this is always verified seeing the instability of the body, which is rapidly changing in a bad state either it happens by fortune or by the threats of fortune. The body changes easily from the best to the worst and is rotated upside down and it behaves in an immature way”.

Metochites emphasized particularly the instability that prevails in life. He presented as examples the lives of rich people, who became poor, but also the lives of poor people who became rich:

“ἀλλὰ πάντα μεταπίπτει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰς τἀναντία μεταβάλλει καὶ μεταφέρεται· καὶ τὰ μὲν ξὺν λόγῳ μὴν ἔστιν οὗ, τὰ δ’ οὐ, καὶ μετ’ ἀλογίας κρατούσης ὡς μὴ ὄφειλε, καὶ φαῦλα ἐκ χρηστῶν καὶ τἀναντία ἐκ φαύλων” (Metochites, 1966:186-187).

“Human life is always changing and is transferred to the opposite direction than it was earlier. There is no cause for these alterations and so unnecessarily dominate, without benefits and they change human life from good to bad and the opposite that is from bad to good”.

Metochites, based on his personal life, attributes the difficulties of human life to the role or the person that he impersonates in life and he adopted the concept of Epictetus that man is an actor in a role that was given by God. Metochites supported this view in his work *Ἐθικός ἔ Περιπαίδειας* (Metochites, 1995:231). Specifically, he took the occasion of his personal involvement in politics to a degree that not only had to deal with difficult situations but also he was thinking about unpleasant things:

“Καὶ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τῶσάυτης ἄρα τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων κινδυνώδους καὶ χαλεπῆς ἐπιφορᾶς καὶ δυσχρηστίας τὰ κοινὰ πολιτευόμενος καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἔγωγε πᾶσα ἀνάγκη συνέπασχον καὶ ξενεφερόμην δύσελπις καὶ κακοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀγχόμενος, ὡς ἄρα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς τρέχων, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐμαυτοῦ κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἢ τῶν κοινῶν αὐτῶν, ἃ συνδιαφέρειν ἠξιούμην” (Metochites, 1996:193; Epictetus, 2004: ch.17, p. 41; Simplicius, 1800:205; Duhot, 2009:157; Triantari & Sarimichailidou, 2012:153)<sup>3</sup>.

“Not to mention the fact that I exposed myself to dangerous and bad situations indeed to a great extent and had difficulties in my political involvement in the common affairs of the city. And for these reasons I was in need to commiserate and live under constant strain in bad thoughts, as if I was running in favor of the soul struggle, not so much for myself in a lifetime, but for the common affairs, which I considered that they differed”.

Metochites distinguished the miseries, which concerned himself from the role that he played as a politician, so as to reach sorrow and do bad thoughts because he encountered the difficulties to solve the problems of the city. These difficulties not only cause pain and sorrow but also they disturb the mind, if one loses self-control and the bad and sorrowful thoughts dominate his mind. His perception brings back Epictetus’s saying: “The people’s turbulence is not caused by the things but by our opinions of these” (Epictetus, 2004: ch. 5, p. 25. Simplicius, 1800: 104-105, 110; Triantari, 2012:53).

<sup>1</sup>Metochites Theodoros, *Περὶ τοῦ ρητοῦ λέγοντος· οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν βίον ἄλυπον ἐν οὐδενί, καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον μεταβολῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν συγγραφόνα, Miscellanea Philosophica et Historica*. (Amsterdam, 1966), ch. 28, p. 184-195.

<sup>2</sup>. This thesis was supported by Metochites in his work *Ἐθικός ἔ Περιπαίδειας* indicating that the alterations to which human transits are generally due to fortune and external reasons.

<sup>3</sup>. Simplicius, *Commentarius in Epicteti Encheiridion*, 205: “Νυνὶ δὲ σκηνῆ τὸν βίον ἀπεικάζει· καὶ δράματος ὑποκριτὰς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτευομένους καὶ χορηγὸν τοῦ δράματος καὶ διδάσκαλον τὸν θεὸν ὑπογράφει· ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαβεῖν καὶ μὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν”.

In this unpredictable and unexpected change of situations which a human being lives time appears as a healing power of the divine providence, which accommodates the decisions and the purpose of human life:

“Καὶ καινῶν ἐστὶ δραμάτων ὁ χρόνος χορηγός, καὶ προβάλλεται παντοίαν σκηρὴν καὶ χρῆσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, νῦν μὲν τὰ φέρων εὖ τε καὶ μὴ, καὶ δικαίως ἴσως καὶ μὴ, εἰδ’ ὅμως ἐντὸς τῶν τῆς πρόνοιαις ἅπαντα λόγων, καὶ πολὺ τοῖς ἄνωθεν ψηφίσμασι καὶ σκοποῖς ὁμαλῶς, εἰ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀγνοεῖται λόγος τοῦτ’ ἄλλος” (Metochites, 1966:187-188; Simplicius, 1800: 217-218; Beck, 2000:371).

“Time is sponsoring in the new dramatic events, which are presented in every scene (i.e. drama) and they are useful to us now and in the future as well and the good and the bad and the just and the unjust. And as long as there are all in the reasons of the divine providence the decisions are normal and the aims which come from above (i.e. by divine providence), even if we ignore this or the other reason”.

Metochites showed faith in divine providence. In his thought the Christian concept is reconciled for the providence with Epictetus’s perception about the voluntary subordination of the wise to divine will and he faces the changes of life and difficulties with stoic quietness (Epictetus, 2003:122-123; Metochites, 1995:47)<sup>4</sup>. In the above quote Metochites makes a pointing out and an important distinction. Specifically, he points out that in life when events are happening have a starting-point in divine providence, and therefore these events are useful to man whether they are good or bad. Metochites distinguished the role in human or the person from himself. First, he argued that a human being as a person is faced with difficulties and sorrows they are due to the roles, he impersonates, and therefore they are, due to the external causes and have its source in divine providence. Secondly, human being is confronted with the difficulties and sorrow, when he toils for his education with his own will. Education is an instrument of the treatment of the soul which helps him to be away from the irrational acts and negative thoughts.

Metochites, like the Stoic Epictetus (Earl, 2007: 63-64), made the separation between the person and oneself. The person is asked by the divine providence to undertake roles in life, as he assumed himself the role of a politician that he tried to perform well, despite the difficulties and sorrows. As for oneself corresponding to “ἐφ’ ἡμῖν” or whatever is “in our power” of Epictetus, and is equivalent to the decision of a human being to deal but with the education, with the difference that the difficulties he had to face depend on him.

### ***The Sorrow that is up to us***

Metochites opposes the sorrow that is in not our power and it is the result of the role a human impersonates, to the sorrow that is in our power and it is a result of human will. This is the sorrow that a human being causes to himself consciously, when he wants to acquire knowledge that will lead him to reason and moral perfection (Metochites, 1966:188-189; Manos, 2002:77-78.).

Following Simplicius’ line of thought, Metochites considered that the concern for learning is painful and equals to the concern for the reasonable, as it creates a sense of self-consciousness for whatever a human being does. This self-consciousness averts the factor of fortune as a cause of human deeds and leads him to inner consistency with himself. The concern for learning relieves human beings from passions, since they control sorrow with mental and spiritual stability and obtain hopes for the future, despite all misfortunes (Metochites, 1966:188-189; Metochites, 1995: 229; Simplicius, 1800:113, 477). Wealth, death and sickness are beyond our own powers. Learning and education we seek to acquire depend on our own power, and we will pursue education as long as requires. We feel sorrow and sadness due to our *proairesis*. Sorrow that is up to us which a human being experiences during the acquisition of knowledge helps him to get rid of both sorrow and sadness from his life (Metochites, 1966:189; Simplicius, 1800:216; Epictetus, 2002: ch. p. 23-24, p.118-119; Seddon, 2005: 11-12).

Metochites finds the treatment of sorrow that is not up to us in the Stoic completion of the cultivation of ourselves. According to Metochites, learning is a true affluence and bliss in life; this is the one that gives a human being a gentle inner disposition, and makes him a lover of wisdom (Metochites, 1966:190; Simplicius, 1800: 228; Epictetus, 2002: ch. 6-7, p.100- 101; Long, 2002: 231).

<sup>4</sup>. Epictetus, *Discourse A*, 122-123: «Ἀφ’ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων ῥαδίον ἐστὶν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο ἔχη τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν τε συνορατικὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἐκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον».

Metochites stressed the difficulties and sorrows which human beings feel in order, to reach true learning. This sorrow is measured by a human being's own powers. He also poses human *proairesis* as a starting point, when a human being consciously thinks that he takes part in maladies and anguishes which have stood as an obstacle to his life. But here there is the stoic element in Metochites' thought, as long as a human being should be always ready for the alterations that will eventually occur in his life. He may lose some things and some other ones. However, all these alterations should not offend his inner discipline, but on the contrary they can make him view things correctly, bearing always in mind his responsibility that he carries on certain unpleasant situations (Metochites, 1966:188; Simplicius, 1800:109; Epictetus, 2004: ch. 5, p. 27; Triantari & Sarimichailidou, 2012:152). From this position, Metochites stated his preference to those people who see things the right way and accept the sorrowful events, without extremities and irresponsibility and without losing their control. Subsequently, he rejects those who are attracted by "sorrowless life", because they will not reach their inner pursuit and inner freedom (Metochites, 1966:194; Simplicius, 1800:216; Epictetus, 2004: ch. 21, p. 44-45; Dragona-Monachou, 2007:117).

Apparently, by stressing all these Metochites distinguished the sorrow that is not up to us from sorrow that is up to us. On the one hand, a human being loses self-control, as he is inspired by bad and negative thoughts, and yet loses his inner balance and mental discipline. On the other hand, he shows perseverance, responsibility and self-control. Consequently he acts as a wise man who distinguishes what is in his power and what is not in his power.

### Conclusion

Metochites, having as a starting point the common perception that there is no life without difficulties, sadness, anguish and sorrow shows the following:

- a. Metochites opposes the sorrow that the human faces because of role which he plays his life to the sorrow that has a starting-point in the human will.
- b. He distinguished the sorrow that is up to us and the sorrow that is not up to us. In the first case, the changes which are caused by exterior factors in human's life are unforeseen and it's not in our power to change the course of situations. In the second case, the sorrow that is up to us is connected to the internal necessity of humans to be educated and to remove any irrational passion.
- c. Metochites advocates that human being pursues learning by taking part in all maladies having as a starting point and measure his power and his will. The Sorrow that is up to us is the experience of "in our power" (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) and human *proairesis* that distances humans from the confusion of thought and helps them to reflect and confront things in the right way.
- d. Metochites was influenced by Stoic Epictetus and probably by Neoplatonist Simplicius, who was commented on the *Handbook* of Epictetus, regarding the distinction between sorrow that is up to us and sorrow that is not up to us.
- e. Metochites offers a morale to a contemporary human being, with which he renders him responsible not towards the alterations imposed by external factors, but towards alterations that begin from a human being himself. He encourages people to stand upon the alternations of fortune, which may cause them sorrow, pain, anger and any other negative feeling.

### References

- Beck, Hans-Georg (2000) Η Βυζαντινή Χιλιετία [Das byzantinische Jahrtausend]. Μετάφραση Δ. Κούρτοβικ, 3<sup>η</sup> εκδ. Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης.
- Blemmydes, Nicephorus (1784) "De virtute et ascési". Epitome Logic. Leipzig.
- Blemmydes, Nicephorus (2013) "De virtute et ascési", in: E. Gielen (ed.), Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca. Brepols.
- Boter, G. (1999) The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three Christian Adaptations. Leiden.
- Colish, M.L. (1985) The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Studies in the History of Christian Thought. 2 vols. Leiden.
- Constantinides, G. N. (1982) Higher Education in Byzantium in the thirteenth and early fourteenth Centuries (1204-ca. 1310). Nicosia.
- Dragona-Monachou, M. (2007) Epictetus on Freedom: Parallels between Epictetus and Wittgenstein. The Philosophy of Epictetus. Eds. Theodore Scaltsas, and S. Mason Andrew. Oxford-New York, 112-139.
- Duhot, Jean-Jöel (2009) Ο Επίκτητος και η Στωική σοφία. Μτφρ. Δ. Παπαθανασοπούλου. Αθήνα: Ενάλιος.

- Hatch, E. (1957) *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity*. New York.
- Haramoundanis, K. (2007) *Metochites [Metoxites], Theodore [Theodoros, Theoleptos]*. The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers, Springer Reference. Thomas Hockey et al. (eds.). New York: Springer.
- Hüniger, H. (1961) *Katalog der Griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, 1. Wien.
- Earl, B. J. (2007) *The role theory of Epictetus*. Chicago: Illinois.
- Epictetus (1983) *The Handbook of Epictetus*. Transl. by N. P. White. Indianapolis.
- Epictetus (2004) *Εγχειρίδιον. Εισαγωγή-Μετάφραση*, Ν. Μ. Σκουτερόπουλος, Αθήνα: Στιγμή.
- Epictetus (2002) *Discourses I. Μετάφραση –Σχόλια*: Δ. Ν. Ιωαννίδου-Ι. Σ. Χριστοδούλου, Θεσσαλονίκη: Κ. Ζήτρος.
- Loenertz, R.-J. (1953) *Théodore Métochite et son père*. *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 23, 184-194.
- Long, A. A. (2002) *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life*. Oxford [Reprinted 2007].
- Manos, A. (2002) *Η ευδαιμονία ως εύροια βίου στην αρχαία στωϊκή φιλοσοφία*. Αθήνα: Ινστιτούτο του βιβλίου-Καρδαμίτσα.
- Metochites Theodoros, (1966) *Miscellanea Philosophica et Historica*. Amsterdam.
- Metochites Theodoros (1995) *Ἐθικός ἔ Peripaideias. Εισαγωγή-Κριτική έκδοση-Μετάφραση-Σημειώσεις* Ι. Δ. Πολέμης. Αθήνα: Κανάκης.
- Pingree, D. (1964) *Gregory Chioniadēs and Palaeologan astronomy*. *Dumbarton Oaks Paper* 18, 135-160.
- Seddon, K. (2005) *Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes Guides to Stoic Living*. USA and Canada.
- Ševčenko, I. (1975) *Theodore Metochites, the Chora and the Intellectual Trends of his Time*. *The Kriye Djami* 4, 19-55.
- Simplicius (1800) *Commentarius in Epicteti Encheiridion*. T. I. Lipsiae. *Theophrasti Characteres*, ed. F. Dubner, (Paris 1842), 1–138.
- Simplicius (1996) *Commentaires sur le Manuel de Epictète, introduction et édition critique du texte grec* par I. Hadot. Leiden.
- Stob, R (1934/1935) *Stoicism and Christianity*. *Classical Journal* 30, 217–224.
- Tatakis, B. N. (1977) *Η Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία. Μετάφραση από τη γαλλική έκδοση* Ε. Κ. Καλπουρτζή. Αθήνα: Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Παιδείας.
- Treu, M. (1895) *Dichtungen des Gross-Logotheten Theodoros Metochites*. *Programm des Victoria-Gymnasiums zu Potsdam Ostern*. Potsdam, 344-353.
- Triantari-Mara, S. (2002) *Η κριτική του Νικηφόρου Γρηγορά στον Αριστοτέλη. Φιλοσοφικός Λόγος*. Κατερίνη: Επέκταση.
- Triantari, S. (2014) *Stoicism and Byzantine philosophy Proairesis in Epictetus and Nicephorus Blemmydes*. *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 17, 85-98.
- Triantari, S. & Sarimichailidou, F. (2012) *Learning as a way of the treatment of pathos and acquisition of eudaimonia in Epictetus and Theodoros Metochites*. *Skepsis*, XXII/IV, 150-159.
- Triantari, S. A. (2012) *Το πορτρέτο του φιλοσόφου κατά τον Επίκτητο ως βάση της φιλοσοφικής συμβουλευτικής*. Θεσσαλονίκη: Αντων. Σταμούλης.