American International Journal of Social Science

ISSN 2325-4149(Print), ISSN 2325-4165(Online) DIO: 10.30845/aijss

Logical Positivist Conception of Knowledge and the Verification Principle: A Reflection
Ade-Ali, Funmilayo A.

Abstract
The Logical positivist conception of knowledge holds that for any statement to be cognitively meaningful it should fall within the scope of the language of science. Thus meaningful statement of any sort can either be analytic or synthetic. By and large, the Vienna Circle of the logical positivists of the 1920s located its own world view of philosophy within the scientific world view with the establishment of the following theses viz:
1. The thesis of meaninglessness of Metaphysics
2. The Verification Principle
3. The Physicalist thesis.
These theses therefore form the unifying factors among the continental logical positivists. And these theses by the language of the logical positivists are against the “traditional” and “metaphysical” conceptions of knowledge. The Logical analysis of Rudolf Carnap, one of the greatest members of logical positivism school makes several proclamations about these with a view to refining the language of philosophy in line with the physical and the scientific construction of language. It is in tune with this principle that the logical positivist conception of knowledge with its principle of verification is addressed and evaluated in this work.

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